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Abstract—Quantum key distribution (QKD) has received great
attention towards future secure communication systems. Since
the laws of the quantum mechanics make sure the security and
it cannot be cracked by using any mathematical method, there
is a great deal of research work in this area which achieves
groundbreaking progress. However, some obvious issues are still
the obstacle of the daily use of QKD, such as the distance of
communications. Using trusted repeaters is a promising approach
to extend the range of QKD. This paper proposes a possible QKD
system with current network structures and comes up with a
novel method of using trusted repeaters to satisfy the requirement
of secure QKD network.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution, trusted repeaters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The communication security is becoming increasingly im-
portant since our world never needs to communicate as fre-
quently as it does today. Variety of cryptography algorithms
are adopted in our communications to make sure that our mes-
sages and information are secure. The traditional cryptography
is based on the mathematical complexity, for example, the
RSA public-key cryptography. It is impossible to decrypt a
cipher text which is encrypted by RSA algorithm in reasonable
time. However, with the development of quantum computing,
particularly the Shor’s algorithm, which can crack the keys
generated by RSA in polynomial time [1], [2], the encryption
will not be secure any longer. In this case, a completely
different percept of communications based on the laws of
quantum mechanics is addressed, which is widely known as
the quantum communication.
One type of quantum communications, also as the most
maturely developed one, the quantum key distribution (QKD)
has been exploited by many research groups all over the world
in last decades and it has been proved that QKD provides a
promising security in communications [3]. On the other hand,
a plenty of experiments on QKD have been completed or
are ongoing. Very recently, a long distance quantum com-
munication between outer space and the ground makes the
distance of the QKD implementation be raised up to 1,200
kilometres via wireless channel by quantum communication
satellite and ground stations [4]. In addition, the Beijing-
Shanghai Backbone Network in China, which is the QKD link
spanning over 2,000 kilometres has also been put in use. This
is the longest distance implemented the QKD around the world
currently. In addition, plenty of applications of different types
of QKD are been researching and developing.
As these practical implementations of QKD are rapidly
maturing, it is reasonable to believe that the QKD used in
people’s daily lives will be the trend in the near future. Thus,
this paper proposes a novel idea of combining QKD with
modern networks as its main contribution. Furthermore, a new
method of using trusted repeaters to extend the range of QKD
is proposed as well.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In section
II, it reviews QKD, especially the original BB84 protocol,
which is the fundamental of current implementations of QKD.
In section III, the system description is given, including the
protocol of using trusted repeaters. Finally, the conclusion is
shown in section IV.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
Bennett and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol,
which is well known as BB84 protocol [5]. The BB84 protocol
now is widely researched and even used, and there are many
practical implementations using some advanced techniques,
such as the decoy-state QKD (DSQKD) and the measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDIQKD). For realising the orig-
inal BB84 protocol, the quantum bit or qubit needs to be
described. The qubit is the minimum information for quan-
tum computation and quantum information, which typically
represents a microscopic system and corresponds to ’bit’ in
the classical computation, such as an atom or a polarized
photon. Two orthogonal states, for example, the polarization
of a photon, both direction of vertical/horizontal and direction
of 45 degree/-45 degree can be encoded as the bit 0 and 1.
Conventionally the qubit is denoted by Dirac symbol as |0〉
and |1〉. Therefore, the correspondence of photon polarization
and qubits is depicted as Fig. 1 (a). Because of the uncertainty
principle of quantum mechanics, it must be measured when
there comes a qubit so that it is able to be known what the state
of the qubit is. Therefore, in quantum information, another
necessary processing is the measurement. Suppose that there
is a communication system between Alice and Bob, and Alice
as the transmitter, wants to send a photon to Bob. The photon is
polarized as vertical or horizontal to represent qubit |0〉 or |1〉.
Bob can decode the qubit via measuring the transmitted photon
by using the vertical/horizontal measuring basis perfectly. But
he only has 50% probability to get the correct result if the
other measuring basis is used. In other words, it is impossible




Fig. 1. (a) Qubits encoded by the directions of the photon polarization. The
qubit |0〉 corresponds to the horizontal polarization or 45 degree polarization,
and the qubit |1〉 corresponds to the vertical polarization or -45 degree polar-
ization. (b) Two orthogonal measuring basas. (c) Prepared vertical/horizontal
polarized photon is measured by different basis, it is 0.5 chance to get qubit
|0〉 or |1〉 if using the wrong basis.
Fig. 2. The demonstration of BB84 flow.
basis. In this case, the measuring basis and the measuring
process are depicted in Fig. 1 (b) and (c).
To sum up, a general discription of BB84 protocol is given
below:
1. The transmitter (Alice) generates 4 types of keys (vertical,
horizontal, 45 degree and -45 degree) randomly, then the
state of the key has been determined.
2. The receiver (Bob) measures the key that Alice sent to
him, by using two types of measuring basis randomly to
decode the key. Since Bob’s measuring basis is chosen
randomly, there is half chance to use the wrong basis.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the result of a bit stream has been
transmitted and received. From Fig. 2, the transmitted




It is easy to see, there must be some
incorrect measurements. The incorrect rate
can be calculated as 50%(wrong basis) ∗
50%(correct rate in wrong basis) = 25%.
3. Bob tells Alice what type of measuring basis he chose for
each encoded qubit via the public channel which can be
eavesdropped by the eavesdropper Eve. Then, according
to this public information, Alice is able to know which
basis is right and which is wrong from comparing with
her own polarization of photons she just sent.
4. Finally, Alice tells Bob which results of wrong basis need
to be discarded via the public channel. The remained
results Bob measured are the final sifted results. These
two remained sequences are all the same in both Alice’s
and Bob’s sides, and the same sequence is the generated
secret key.
From the description above, the rest of the story becomes
very clear. Even though Eve obtains all the information from
the public channel, she needs to eavesdrop the quantum chan-
nel as well to get the whole information restored. However,
if she did so, the state of the transmitted photon would be
destroyed and this would result in that the error rate increases
rapidly and becomes much higher than the threshold, so that
both communication sides are able to perceive the existance
of the eavesdropper. Therefore, because of the no-cloning
principle of quantum mechanics, the BB84 protocal can build
an absolutely secure communication system theoretically.
In practical implementation of BB84 protocol, due to some
imperfect factors of real-life implementations, the distance of
peer-to-peer QKD is roughly limited. For solving this problem,
the trusted repeater method is one of usually adopted solutions
[6]–[8]. The basic model of this method is illustrated as Fig.
3. In this model, the repeater node is supposed trusted before-
hand, or it cannot guarantee the security. This model is simply
able to be regarded as two parts separately—QKD between
Alice and the repeater, and QKD between the repeater and
Bob. It will generate two different secret keys—K1 and K2,
individually, in these two QKD processes. Thus, at first, the
message flows from Alice to the repeater by being encrypted
with K1. Secondly, it is decrypted in the repeater. Then the
message is encrypted again with K2 that generated by the
repeater and Bob. Finally, Bob receives the encrypted message
Fig. 3. Normal trusted repeater model.
Fig. 4. Layer 3 network structure
and decrypts it using K2. Obviously, it adds an encryption-
decryption process when it adds one more repeater node. In
this paper, we propose a different protocol that allows Alice
and Bob share the secret key and the encryption-decryption is
needed only once.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In the modern life, present network communications involve
a layer structure based on Open System Interconnection (OSI)
model that defines the functions of 7 layers of communication
protocols. Or specifically, a simplified version treated as TCP
model is adoped in most of network scenarios, the Internet for
example. To reference the TCP model, the most of network
devices are working on the second and the third layer, such as
switches and routers. Usually, constructing a network will con-
sider a hierarchical internetworking model, which is formed by
three layers—the access layer, distribution layer and core layer.
These three layers are classified by the logical topology of the
network. If all of these three layers are deployed in a network,
then the network is called layer 3 network. Otherwise, if there
is no core layer in the network, this is called layer 2 network.
A typical topology of the whole layer 3 network is sketched
in Fig. 4.
The layer 3 network includes a core layer. The core layer is
very important since it is the backbone and the data-transfer-
channel of the whole network. It should provide high reliability
and high efficiency of the data transportation across a network.
Communications in the layer 3 network are able to span
multiple collision domains via IP routing. Therefore, for this
Fig. 5. A simplest QKD combined network model. There are two links
between each terminal and the switch module. The quantum channel can be
treated as a virtual logical link, which is used to transmit qubits (photons).
reason, constructing a large-scale network usually considers
adopting this structure.
The layer 2 network, which only has the access layer
and the distribution layer, is relatively more simple than the
operation of the layer 3 network. In the layer 2 network,
switches forward all the data packages according to MAC
address tables. All the terminal devices are located in the
same collision domain in the layer 2 network. This means it
limits the expansion of the layer 2 network to a large extent.
Therefore, layer 2 network is always used to build the small-
scale local area network (LAN).
To simplify the analysis of the network structure that
combined with QKD, the layer 2 networt will be considered
at first.
As Fig. 5 shows, terminals and the switch module are
connected by two links, which are classical channel and
quantum channel separately. The classical channel is used to
transfer the classical data as usual, while the quantum channel
is used to transmit quantum information. Since the adopted
quantum source is polarized photons, for the reason of cost
efficiency, the quantum channel is supposed to be the reuse of
the classical optical fiber. It is worth noticing that the switch
module can exist in both the access layer or the distribution
layer for the layer 2 network.
The difference between terminals and switch modules is
in terminals, the quantum source sends qubits according to
random numbers that generated by random number generators
(RNGs), while switch modules do not need RNGs. The reason
for this difference is that we only need to initialise the
encoded key at the stage of that the transmitter sending qubits
according to random numbers. The basic idea of the whole
QKD procedure is depicted as the flow diagram in Fig. 6.
According to the diagram, the protocol can be described as
below.
1. Alice chooses some quantum states randomly and sends
them to trusted repeater 1. Then repeater 1 sends the
measurement results back to Alice. Alice then knows in
Fig. 6. QKD procedure with trusted repeaters.
which positions the bits should be kept and stores the
positions as the mask.
2. Alice sends the mask to repeater 1. Repeater 1 then knows
which bits should be kept as well.
3. Repeater 1 sends quantum states to repeater 2 according
to the key it sifted with Alice at the first stage and
receives measurement results from repeater 2. Then it
knows which bits should be kept and stores positions as
the mask.
4. Repeater 1 sends the mask to repeater 2. Repeater 2 then
knows which bits should be kept and stores positions as
the mask as well.
5. Repeater 1 sends the mask it stored back to Alice and
lets Alice update her mask.
6. Repeat process 3 and 4 between two adjacent repeaters,
and the mask will be sent back to Alice via previous
repeaters in each stage.
7. Repeater N iterates the same QKD process with Bob.
8. Repeater N tells Bob the remained sequence. At this
stage, Bob achieves the final secret key.
9. Repeater N sends the mask back to Alice via other
repeaters to let Alice update her mask again. Finally,
Alice knows the final secret key.
This procedure also needs repeaters be trusted and it makes
the key shorter and shorter from the raw key randomly gen-
erated by Alice. Because of the sifted key has approximately
half of the length of the raw key in each QKD process, the
final key length l can be expressed as
l = L · (1
2
)n−1,
where L is the raw key length that Alice transmitted and n is
the number of all nodes in the cummunication, which includes
Fig. 7. Secret key length with different numbers of repeaters.
Alice and Bob themselves. So n− 2 represents the number of
trusted repeater nodes. The relationship between secret key
lengths and numbers of trusted repeater nodes can be seen in
Fig. 7 clearly. From Fig. 7, it is easy to know when the length
of secret key is specified, it needs a relative long raw key
that generated by Alice. Furthermore, the number of trusted
repeaters affects the length of the raw key seriously. Since
a longer secret key is able to provide higher security, this
protocol will have more effectivity and efficiency when the
number of trusted repeaters is not too large.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a potential application of QKD in
current network by combining the QKD with typical network
structure, and designs a new protocol using trusted repeaters,
which is different from the normal trusted repeater method, so
that it can reduce the number of encryption and decryption in
communications.
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